Off Topic A place for you car junkies to boldly post off topic. ALMOST anything goes. Fun, laughs and good times here.
Sponsored by:
Sponsored by:

Boeing 737 MAX

 
  #1  
Old 03-22-2019, 02:39 PM
Senior Member
Thread Starter
Join Date: May 2012
Location: New Jersey
Posts: 396
Likes: 0
Received 227 Likes on 137 Posts
Default Boeing 737 MAX

I thought I'd start this thread because two Boeing aircraft crashes are unusual these days and two that are so similar are very unusual and many people are talking about it.
This might get long, but for those who are interested, here we go.
Although I wasn't there, thank God, I feel that I can offer some insight into what probably happened with these two aircraft.
I'm not a pilot and I don't know everything by any means, but I just retired from a career in commercial aircraft maintenance.
I solved the pilot's problems with Boeing aircraft, among others, for a living. I worked on older versions of the 737 but not the newer ones.
The new versions and the ones I worked on have some differences but I think I can get through most of that.
The issue with the two recent crashes focuses on the angle of attack sensors, or AOA sensors.
One is installed on each side of the aircraft usually below the cockpit windows. They are reliable, but they fail once in while. I've changed a few.
The angle of attack is the difference between the attitude of the airplane (nose up or down) and the direction of the airplane through the air. Smooth air over the wings produces maximum lift. At too high a nose up attitude in relation to the direction of travel, airflow over the wings becomes disturbed and lift is reduced. At the extreme, the aircraft "stalls" and bad things follow. Stall recovery is basic pilot training.
The angle of the aircraft in relation to the earth is of minimal importance. What is importance is the angle of the aircraft in relation to the direction of the aircraft through the air. Have you ever seen a 757 climb after takeoff? Nose high there is very normal because it's climbing like the space shuttle.
In other words, if the nose is pointed up at 45 degrees and the aircraft is climbing at 45 degrees, it's all good. The problem arises when the nose is 45 degrees up and the aircraft isn't climbing. (I picked 45 as an arbitrary number just for discussion).
Stick your hand out of a moving car and you can feel this as you change the angle of your hand. Thumb up and the hand goes up. Thumb too high and the hand becomes a barn door. (Barn doors don't fly well)
The early versions of the 737 (and 727 and others of the same generation) would have a stall warning computer that reads inputs from the AOA sensors. There is a test panel on the overhead panel in the cockpit to test the AOA system. As I recall, there was a warning light on the panel. (It's been a few years)
On each pilot's control column there was a stick shaker. An impending stall would cause the stick shaker to be activated by the stall warning computer and the pilot would have a handful of bees. This is his clue to push the control wheel, which is at the top of the control column, forward, thereby pitching the aircraft nose down and arresting the stall.
Further technological developments in later years included a stick nudger, which would do just that, nudge the control column forward.
Apparently, in the interest of reducing flight crew workload; after all, he has to put down the Wall Street Journal to push the control column forward (that's an industry joke in aircraft maintenance, that we need to reduce pilot workload so that he can spend more time tracking his investments) it seems that Boeing has taken the pilots out of this process and chosen to remedy an impending stall by trimming the horizontal stabilizer toward nose down. The horizontal stabilizer is the big horizontal part of the tail. Trimming means to reposition it. Electric trim control switches are located on the center pedestal (I think at the back of the pedestal) for ease of access by both pilots. Remember that detail.
The autopilot system (which is always engaged to reduce the aforementioned sin of pilot workload) can command the horizontal trim motor to trim the horizontal stabilizer either up or down as necessary and the pilots will know this is happening because on each side of the pedestal is a big black wheel with a white stripe across it. This is the manual horizontal trim wheel and if needed, either pilot can fold out the handle and manually trim the horizontal stabilizer. When the autopilot is trimming the horizontal stabilizer, these wheels turn because of mechanical linkage to the trim system. This makes some noise when operating and you can't miss it, and you see this white stripe passing by every couple of seconds to know that it is, in fact, turning.
MCAS is a new system that Boeing installed to compensate for some performance variations as they made modifications to the 737. Its sole purpose is to trim the nose of the aircraft down in certain circumstances with no flight crew action so its activation would mimic that of the autopilot for trimming the horizontal stabilizer by use of the electric motor. MCAS may or may not go through the autopilot computers but it makes no difference. MCAS is apparently overridden if the pilots manually trim the horizontal stabilizer with either wheel on the center pedestal but I'd like to see a pilot fold a handle out of a rotating wheel to turn it by hand. Good luck with that. OK, so the flight crew knows that the horizontal stabilizer is being trimmed nose down during takeoff. This is not good but let's say they choose to ignore this.
Flight crew notification for any information is almost always on EICAS, which is the system of screens that display the status of all systems on the aircraft. Warnings are presented to the flight crew in different colors and order based on urgency and may by accompanied by a discreet light, a small rectangular light on the forward or overhead panels with a backlit few words for information, and may also be accompanied by an audible alert such as a chime.
It is possible that Boeing may offer the discreet light and/or chime as an option that an airline may or may not purchase but whatever they choose, they need to train their flight crews accordingly, but, basically, everything is on EICAS and every aircraft has that.
(The older 737's that I worked on did not have EICAS, but other Boeings that I'm familiar with did have EICAS)
When a Boeing aircraft has two redundant sensors, as they do for the landing gear, a disagreement between sensors is reported by EICAS as just that. Normally in this case, based on the particular system, part or all of the system may be disabled, either automatically or through flight crew action.
It would be unfortunate if Boeing designed the AOA to allow one malfunctioning sensor to drive an aircraft into the ground. Even if they did, it shouldn't happen.
Here's why:
At worst, if the AOA is telling the autopilot to trim the horizontal stabilizer nose down during climb out, the pilots should identify this and take appropriate action, which is to turn off the horizontal stabilizer trim (an electric motor). The switches are on the center pedestal for their use. Or they could "gasp" disengage the autopilot and hand fly the airplane, which is physical work so we avoid that at all costs. (More sarcasm)
It is reported that the Lion Air airplane had the same problem on a previous flight and a third "jumpseating" pilot turned off the horizontal stabilizer switches.
Based on the way this is being reported, it sounds as if it takes three people to successfully deal with this problem. (How could Boeing design such a thing?)
Nothing could be further from the truth. The 737 cockpit is small. I've ridden in them a few times. I prefer not to. The jumpseater is sitting in the jumpseat, which folds out of the cockpit door and has the jumpseater straddling the center console.
Jumpseating pilots assist the pilots flying as professional courtesy. So, when it comes time to turn off the switches for the horizontal stabilizer trim, I can see that rather than reaching between another guy's legs, the pilots flying simply ask him to hit the switches. I would be money that it happened that way.
Further, there is absolutely no way that the jumpseating pilot would dare touch any switch or control in the cockpit without the full knowledge and concurrence of the pilots in charge, especially in flight.
That is not worthy of reporting on CNN. I've helped pilots and I don't get coverage on CNN.
Regardless, all three pilots in that cockpit and the ones in the crash work for the same company and therefore get the same training. Both incidents should have been handled in exactly the same way.
There is probably blame to spread around to Boeing, the FAA or other country's equivalent, maintenance for not fixing the problem, and the flight crews.
But there is no way this problem should bring down these aircraft if the flight crews are properly trained and perform as expected.
These same aircraft operate in the USA all day, every day without incident.
All of the flight crew workload saving technology is great for aviation overall, but it is having a detrimental effect on basic piloting skills.
Sully, an old school pilot with a domestic air carrier, lost both engines on takeoff over New York City and everyone survived.
These guys in foreign countries lose one sensor and everyone dies.
I see a difference.
Questions? LOL
 

Last edited by stu46h; 03-22-2019 at 06:47 PM.
The following 5 users liked this post by stu46h:
GGG (03-23-2019), Grant Francis (03-23-2019), LnrB (03-23-2019), michaelh (04-11-2019), sklimii (04-19-2019)
  #2  
Old 03-22-2019, 03:01 PM
jackra_1's Avatar
Veteran Member
Join Date: Aug 2014
Location: MD
Posts: 3,815
Received 908 Likes on 702 Posts
Default

Turning off autopilot also turns off AOA?
 
  #3  
Old 03-22-2019, 03:39 PM
King Charles's Avatar
Veteran Member
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: North Carolina,USA
Posts: 3,726
Received 613 Likes on 495 Posts
Default

I picked up some Boeing stock @ the start of this it dipped rather low, small hiccup for a giant.
 
The following users liked this post:
Reverend Sam (05-10-2019)
  #4  
Old 03-22-2019, 03:42 PM
Senior Member
Thread Starter
Join Date: May 2012
Location: New Jersey
Posts: 396
Likes: 0
Received 227 Likes on 137 Posts
Default

AOA sensors become active on the takeoff roll based on a preset airspeed as I recall.
They are heated for icing protection but we don't want the heat turned on unless we are moving.
The AOA sensors are active for the entire flight.
There is no ON/OFF switch for the AOA sensors. It's a pretty autonomous system.
The planes I worked on had AOA sensors, a computer, a panel in the cockpit with a test button, a stick shaker on each control column, and a circuit breaker.
Push the test button and watch the control columns shake.
A simple system that caused very little trouble.
 
  #5  
Old 03-22-2019, 06:47 PM
Steve M's Avatar
Veteran Member
Join Date: Jul 2012
Location: Wiltshire, UK
Posts: 3,866
Received 1,236 Likes on 934 Posts
Default

Stu.
That is the most fantastical explanation of how airplanes actually fly that I have ever read.
It makes me more determined than ever to never set foot on one as long as my **** points downwards.
I work at sea and I'm worried about the level of 'sentient' automation that is not so much creeping in but being dumped on us like an avalanche.
When the company got their 'New, advanced ship' it turned out that if you have a fire onboard, the computer would decide which fire pumps to start.
If it felt like it.
Excuse me? There is a fire on the ship (been there 5 times), I want all the fire pumps running right now!
There is a real concern (not sure if it is the same in the aviation industry?) at sea for the likelihood of the automated systems being hijacked, remotely.
It has been proved, (deliberately, as a test) that someone can hack into the controls of a large passenger vessel and change its course and speed.
Which is a bit scary.
I have had a radar failure (in fog) and couldn't restart it because it was a Windows based system and they hadn't left us the passwords after commissioning!
Mind you; being on a ship if it goes dark and you sit there like a dumb **** you aren't actually plummeting earth bound at 9.8 metres per second squared which I guess isn't all bad.
Hats off to you matey.
 
  #6  
Old 03-22-2019, 11:48 PM
DavidYau's Avatar
Senior Member
Join Date: Jan 2019
Location: Bahrain
Posts: 682
Received 207 Likes on 150 Posts
Default Fascinating account of when sensors become a life and death problem

Great read! Not one to moan about computers and sensors, but We all know how the sensors themselves could cause problems. But with the back up redundant systems on aircraft, itís hard to imagine how pilots would allow automated systems to take over and crash a plane. In the skies, itís inexcusable for Pilots to not know how to turn off assisted systems and go to manual
 
  #7  
Old 03-23-2019, 02:03 PM
Senior Member
Thread Starter
Join Date: May 2012
Location: New Jersey
Posts: 396
Likes: 0
Received 227 Likes on 137 Posts
Default

Airplanes began with fully manual controls. Airbus has actually been building airplanes without a traditional control column, but a joystick, like a freaking video game. It's referred to as "fly by wire" and it's exactly what it sounds like. I'm OK with that stuff to lighten pilot workload but the person sitting up front does need to take the airplane away from the computer. That's where Boeing and Airbus have different philosophies today. Airbus is OK, but Boeing still gives the pilot ultimate final authority, which is why I prefer Boeing products.
Don't be afraid to fly, at least in this country. Flying is by far safer than driving. Everyone involved in the operation of aircraft is trained to perform his or her job. The airplanes are incredibly well designed, structurally. The systems for the most part are well proven. The people who operate commercial airlines and aircraft really know what they are doing, and there is a small army of them behind every flight. The industry is moving from changing a part on condition (after it fails) to, for example, monitoring the time it takes a valve to move open or closed and changing it before it fails completely. Engines send performance data to engineers continuously for trend monitoring.
There are continuous efforts to improve all aspects of aviation, especially safety.
I remember the first time I fixed an airplane, then flew home in it. It's a defining moment in your career, and life.
In my career, my company lost three aircraft. Two to hazmat fires and one was flight crew error due to fatigue and other factors. None due to maintenance issues. The biggest problem I see today is undeclared hazmat, especially cheap lithium batteries from China. It's not the airplane or the people operating them, it's what we load on them that we need to worry about.
Accidents are so rare these days because when an accident happens, the cause is determined and changes are made accordingly. Certain improvements such as Cockpit Resource Management may not have gotten to all corners of the world yet, but in the US, Europe, and most of Asia, I'm comfortable flying. Different cultures have embraced the modern safety cultures to different degrees, as we see in the two 737 MAX crashes. I have a hard time believing that this problem hasn't happened here, but these same aircraft operate in the USA without incident. To me the difference is maintenance and flight crew training.
As far as some hacker taking over an airplane, it's as impossible as a hacker taking over my digital alarm clock or my coffee maker.
An airplane has plenty of computers, but they aren't anything like what I'm typing on. The only computers that receive outside signals are for navigation and communication.
The navigation receivers can direct the airplane, but only if the pilot selects them to do that through the autopilot. The communication radios are just that, nothing more.
In order for anyone to take over an aircraft remotely, the aircraft has to be built for that, and in commercial aviation, none are.
I'm sure that the FAA would not certify the airplane if anyone tried.
I think that the design of the MCAS system on the 737 MAX could use improvement, but that's nothing new in aviation. Improvement is continuous.
In case of fire, almost all firefighting decisions are made by the pilots, with very few exceptions.
Smoke detectors are in all baggage and cargo compartments partly due to the Valuejet crash, which was due to a hazmat issue.
Fire on an airplane is as bad as fire in a boat with one exception: you can jump off a boat.
 
  #8  
Old 03-23-2019, 08:01 PM
King Charles's Avatar
Veteran Member
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: North Carolina,USA
Posts: 3,726
Received 613 Likes on 495 Posts
Default

 
  #9  
Old 03-24-2019, 04:52 PM
Senior Member
Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: Southern Califonia
Posts: 182
Received 57 Likes on 39 Posts
Default

There is more info on the backstory coming out, but the upcoming software fixes and new pilot training packages should should put the MAX back in the sky with all Airlines, Airline Union reps and worldwide Regulatory Agencies getting to review and comment. AA pilots were to be in Boeing Flight simulator this weekend testing the new protocols and Difference Training Packages. The information is from numerous press releases and not from a signal reliable source such as Boeing, FAA or NTSB

How we got here: The Max is a modern derivative of the 737 and was certified for crews as a common aircraft once you had been trained for differences between the older model and the new Max version. The system under review, was not in the initial design and was put in after flight testing of the new MAX indicated it had a greater tenancy to stall at similar AOA (angle of Attack) and airspeed than the original 737. The normal indication systems for impending stall is a mechanically induced vibration felt in the control column, and in the case of most British Certified Aircraft a, stick-pusher-actuator, that forces the column forward. This lowers AOA and increases airspeed, taking the aircraft out of pre-stall environment.
Boeing MAX system actually gives the input to the trim system to lower nose (lower AOA and subsequent increase of speed) to get out of the pre-stall environment. This automatic down trim is not what current 737 pilots are used to. So the training on this new system by default, two accidents, was not adequate. The fail-safe features of this system, with a bad signal from AOA sensor, failed to take itself out of action, when source information was suspect. (Example the triple autopilot systems required for auto-landing the aircraft monitor each other; the one autopilot system that is suspect, is cut out by the other two systems.The pilots can see this through monitoring the autopilot indications, but do not have to do any thing. If the remaining two autopilot systems disagree, the the pilot must take over and land manually.)

The key to what was happening is on the two Cockpit Voice Recorders of the Indonesian aircraft. First flight crew went manual and recovered. Second flight crew was fighting the inputs with column inputs while reading through a check-list to see what to do. This is when jump seat rider told them to turn off the Stabilizer Trim; the crew recovered the aircraft. Third flight was similar to second, in that the crew countering autonomous trim down inputs with the column, while reading a check list trying to find solution; they did not recover, they ran out of time. The two accidents, were departure climb-out related, and at low altitude, so not much time to figure out what was happening.
God Bless the Families of the two accidents
 

Last edited by David84XJ6; 03-25-2019 at 12:43 AM. Reason: typo
  #10  
Old 03-25-2019, 08:21 AM
Senior Member
Thread Starter
Join Date: May 2012
Location: New Jersey
Posts: 396
Likes: 0
Received 227 Likes on 137 Posts
Default

Good information. The QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) is very useful, when you have the time to read it. Shortly after takeoff you don't have that time and steps needed to deal with a problem just after takeoff need to be committed to memory.
The pilots don't need to know why the horizontal trim system is trimming the airplane nose down during takeoff and climb.
They just need to recognize it, stop it, then figure it out later when they have time. According to the previous post they were distracted by looking in the QRH. Fatal mistake.
CRM (Cockpit Resource Management) is about avoiding this mistake, and others. We are back to flight crew training.
I believe this is where they failed.
Poor piloting caused loss of life and now Boeing will design a system that can accomodate poor piloting, but this beast will show its face again sooner or later if they don't improve training.
Again, this is more of a foreign carrier problem in certain parts of the world.
Stuff happens during flight and the job of a pilot is to deal with it. Weather, mechanical problems, passenger problems, bird strikes, route changes, and others.
Training is extremely important.
Back to Sully's landing in the Hudson for a great example.
 
  #11  
Old 03-25-2019, 11:33 AM
DavidYau's Avatar
Senior Member
Join Date: Jan 2019
Location: Bahrain
Posts: 682
Received 207 Likes on 150 Posts
Default S&@t happens

Originally Posted by stu46h View Post
Good information...
Stuff happens during flight and the job of a pilot is to deal with it.
Well said. Makes me worried with future autonomous cars... Make no mistake that this is coming ... and s£&t will happen....
 
  #12  
Old 03-25-2019, 05:26 PM
Senior Member
Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: Southern Califonia
Posts: 182
Received 57 Likes on 39 Posts
Default

Coming from those at Boeing this weekend. The anti-stall system - known as MCAS, or Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System: Boeing Co software fix for the grounded 737 MAX will prevent repeated operation of an anti-stall system at the center of safety concerns and deactivate it altogether if two sensors disagree too much, two people familiar with pilot briefings said.

Pilots have been told that the MCAS system - which forces the nose downwards to avoid a stall, or loss of lift - will only operate one time for each event rather than impose repeated corrections like those believed to have pushed the Lion Air jet into a dive, the people familiar with the briefings said.

Additionally, MCAS will be disabled whenever two sensors that measure the 'angle of attack' - a parameter that determines how close a plane is to an aerodynamic stall - differ too widely.

Boeing will also make standard, a previously optional warning light.
 

Last edited by David84XJ6; 03-26-2019 at 03:20 PM.
  #13  
Old 03-25-2019, 11:36 PM
Senior Member
Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: Southern Califonia
Posts: 182
Received 57 Likes on 39 Posts
Default

You are correct.

If this was a US carrier, the chief pilot and the Safety officer would have been on phone with first crew and without a good fix (verified malfunction with a maintenance manual check-out procedure) plane would not fly again. Second pilot would have been briefed before takeoff and a good or repeat message to Chief pilot thru dispatch would have been made. If problem came back, next call would have been to Boeing.

Our 747-cargo airline in Florida gave all flight crew IBM lap-tops and Black-Berrys, so an "All Crew Message" would have gone out before any further flights system wide. Our Cockpit had SAT phones, so anywhere in world we had communications with flight crews.

Speculation on my part”: First Indonesian crew may have thought they screwed up, so didn't make a big deal out of it.

US flight crews are spring loaded to make a big deal out of anything that challenges them.

AA, SW & UA pilots were at Boeing Saturday in MAX simulator checking new software protocols and reviewing training packages. With those three airlines involved, the new training package should be top notch. We had our pilots trained by UAL pilots on Cockpit Resource Management for two years, before we taught it in house. Rgds David
 

Last edited by David84XJ6; 03-25-2019 at 11:42 PM. Reason: info clarification
  #14  
Old 03-26-2019, 04:42 PM
Senior Member
Thread Starter
Join Date: May 2012
Location: New Jersey
Posts: 396
Likes: 0
Received 227 Likes on 137 Posts
Default

I can see how it would be difficult to overcome horizontal stabilizer trim with the control column (which operates the elevator). The elevator is the movable surface at the back of the horizontal stabilizer. The stabilizer is a much larger surface than the elevator so the pilots are at a disadvantage.
What I don't understand is how the pilots can not realize that the horizontal stabilizer is being trimmed nose down, or that they didn't know how to stop it.
All those switches in the cockpit are there for a reason, and they are not there for looks. Pilots need to know what those switches do and when to use them.
It sounds like what they're doing will take care of the problem.
Even if it doesn't, I'm sure that every 737 pilot in the world is now very aware of this issue so they will be ready and able to deal with it in the future. I hope.
 
  #15  
Old 04-05-2019, 05:20 AM
Queen and Country's Avatar
Veteran Member
Join Date: Mar 2015
Location: Hastings
Posts: 5,311
Received 1,316 Likes on 971 Posts
Default

In this age of autonomous driving, and giving priority to software; we are making an unintentional but grave error......

I was in a former life in software. We had a mission critical system crash. When we traced the root of the problem. It was erroneous logic by one of the hundreds of programmers, out of hundreds of thousand lines of code. Out of millions of possible scenarios.

What most folks dont know is that the biggest and most resourceful companies in the world, dont have the resources to test all the scenarios. It can only be done by the public, the Guinea pigs. This is why even a software from Microsoft has many bugs initially and then stabilizes after getting enough feedback from the field. Even a 100,000 programmers cannot test for every eventuality that the public will encounter.

The inherit problem in autonomous driving or driver replacement software is that they are designed to second-guess and override the human.
 
The following users liked this post:
michaelh (04-11-2019)
  #16  
Old 04-05-2019, 11:04 AM
Veteran Member
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: Tehama County, California, USA
Posts: 17,167
Received 3,471 Likes on 2,708 Posts
Default

I have heard it said, on more than one occasion, "To err is human, but to Really screw things up you need a computer."
(';')
 
  #17  
Old 04-10-2019, 12:43 PM
Gas Cat's Avatar
Junior Member
Join Date: Oct 2018
Location: Marin County California
Posts: 18
Received 5 Likes on 4 Posts
Default

Boeing Corporate does not deserve a free pass on this. Their goal was to produce a plane that required minimal retraining (i.e. expense) for their customers already flying 737 NG's. To that end, the MCAS was barely mentioned in training materials and (reports say) completely missing from simulator training. Engineers developed a system in response to management that met (some engineers apparently don't agree) principals of design and safety of flight but failed in the real world - people died that should not have. Boeing initially tried to blame developing world crews lack of skills and training coupled with poor maintenance. That is a comforting thought for first world passengers and crews but it wasn't the whole story. You can't train for something you don't know exists. The dollar trumped the value of a life.
 
The following 2 users liked this post by Gas Cat:
David84XJ6 (04-10-2019), oyster (04-10-2019)
  #18  
Old 04-11-2019, 05:33 AM
Scarecrow's Avatar
Senior Member
Join Date: Jul 2014
Location: Miami
Posts: 164
Received 57 Likes on 32 Posts
Default

This was a very interesting read. Learned alot.
 
  #19  
Old 04-18-2019, 08:44 PM
Veteran Member
Join Date: May 2010
Location: Arlington, VA USA
Posts: 6,290
Received 452 Likes on 378 Posts
The following 2 users liked this post by amcdonal86:
LnrB (04-18-2019), sklimii (04-19-2019)
  #20  
Old 04-19-2019, 07:22 AM
jackra_1's Avatar
Veteran Member
Join Date: Aug 2014
Location: MD
Posts: 3,815
Received 908 Likes on 702 Posts
Default

In a former life I used to sell "components" of mission critical systems and help plan them and worked for several companies over time while focusing on mission critical issues.

Mostly financial. So I have always been interested in this arena which now for me translates to a mild interest in Electronic Warfare.

For me my worry is that as systems become more complex and interconnected the chance of an error OR the opportunity for exploitation grows.
 

Thread Tools
Search this Thread
Quick Reply: Boeing 737 MAX


Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service

© 2019 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands

We are a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a means for us to earn fees by linking to Amazon.com and affiliated sites.
 
  • Ask a Question
    Get answers from community experts
Question Title:
Description:
Your question will be posted in: